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This pap e r pr esen ts a dynam ic m od e l o f endogenous coal it i on f orm ati on i nc o o p e r a tiv eg am es
wi t h transferable util ity . The pla y e rs are b oundedly r a ti onal. A t each tim e step, a pl ayer de c ides
whic ho f the e xi st i ng coal iti ons to jo in, and demands a pa yo￿. The se de cisio ns a r e det erm ine d b y
a (non{co op e rati ve ) b est{re ply rule ,g iv en the coal iti o n str ucture a nd al lo catio ni n the pre vi ous
pe r i od . W e sho w that abs o rb i ng s ta te s of the pro c ess exis t if the g am e is e ss e n tia l. F ur ther, if
the pla yer s are allo wed t o exp e rim en t with m y opicall y s ub optimal str a te gi e s whe nev e r th ere a re
p ote n ti al gains from trade , an i som orphi sm b etw een the s et of absorbing s tates of t he pro cess
and the set of core a llo c ati ons c a nb e e st a blished, a nd th e pro cess c o n ve rge s to one of the se
states wi t h p roba bilit yo n e whenev er the c ore is non{ emp t y . Thi s resul t hol ds i nde p en dently
of the f orm of the c haracteristic func tion.
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1 In tro duc tio n
Most eq uilibrium c once p ts in gam es, b oth c o o p erativ e a nd n on{co op e ra ti ve, are
sta ti cb y de￿ni tion. F or e x am ple, th e core o f a c oo pe r at i v e gam e is the set o f
feasibl e all o cati ons tha t can not b e bl oc k e db ya n y coa l it i o n of pl a yers . Th i s
implies th at core a llo cations are sta bl e in the sense tha t, once a core a l lo c a ti on
is ac hiev ed, no sub se t o f pla y ers can g ai nb yd e vi at i ng from it. H o w ever, the se
eq uili brium c on c e pts a bstract from a n y (p o ssibl y) underly ing b argai ning pro cess,
and di sr e g ard the di￿culties tha t arise from c o o rdi na ti o n problem s on the pa rt
of the pla y ers. T h u s, th e theory fail s to expla i n how the pla y ers a r riv e at a c ore
all o cation, or at e quilibrium i n general. I n particul a r, the theo ry of c o op erati ve
ga m es e n tirely i g nores the iss ue of coa l itio n formation .I n order to re ac h a certai n
￿
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1all o cation (core o r o ther wi se ), som ek i n d o f ba rga i ning or co o rdi n ati o n among
the pla y ers i s exp e die n t. Once w ep r e s u pp os e the exis te nce o f su c h a barga i ni ng
pro c ess , w e are able to anal yse questi o ns lik e: Ho w do coa lition s form? H ow do
coalit ion structures c ha nge o ver time? W hi c h o f the p os s i bl ec o a l ition structure s
wil l the pla y ers ev entuall y a rri vea t , and what w i ll b e the result ing all o cation?
Dynamic l ea rni ng m o de ls pro vi de a fr am e w ork for anal ysi ng the s e questi on s .
These m o del s are b a sed o n th e assum pti on that pla y ers a re only b oundedly rat io-
nal, a nd fol low sim ple a daptati o n rul es whi ch are ba sed o n m y op i c optim izat ion.
Whil e dyna m ic le a rni ng m o de ls ha v eb e en wi de ly app l ie d to non{c o op erati ve
ga m es, re lativ el y l ittle re se ar c hi n this ￿ e ld has b een d one w i th resp ect to co-
op e ra ti veg a m es. D espi te th e f a ct tha t the re h a v e b een s e vera l e xp erimen ta l
studies o n coalit i on formation (e.g. Sauerm a nn (1 978), Rap o p o rt, K a han, F unk,
Horo witz (1979)), there are o nl yv e ry few th e or e tica l pa pe rs de al ing wi th the
prob l em o f coa l itio n formation i na d y na m i cc on text. H er e, the w ork b y Sheno y
(19 79,1980 ), P ac k el (1981), an d A ga s t y a (19 97 ) deserv es me n tioning.
The fo l lowing p ap e r p ro vides a dynami c m o del of endo geno us coalition forma -
ti on . A t eac ht i m e s tep, a pl a yer dec id es wh i c ho ft he exis ti ng coa l itio ns to join,
and d e m ands a pa y o￿ .A p l a y e rw i ll join (or qui t) a c o ali ti on if a nd only if he
b eli ev es i ti si n h i so wn b est in te rest to do so. Th e refore , these d e ci s i on s are
1
dete rm ine db y a (no n- c o o p erativ e) b e s t{repl y rul e: Ap l a y e r switc hes c oa l i tions
only if his exp ected pa y o￿ i n the new c o ali tion e xceeds hi s curren tp a y o￿ , a n d
he dem ands the m os t he can get c o ndi tiona l on fe a sibi lit y .M o re prec isely ,t h e
play er o bserv es the prev ailing coa l it i o n structure an d the dem a nds of the o ther
play ers. Exp ec ta ti o ns are a daptiv ei n the s e ns e tha t eac hp l a y e r exp ect st h e
presen tc o ali tion s truc ture a nd dem a nd to prev ail i nt h e n e xt p e rio d. The pl ay er
then c ho os e s the co al ition in whic h he can dem and th e highest p ossi ble pa y o￿ ,
given the dem a nds o f the o t he rm emb ers o f tha t coa l itio n, a nd sub je ct to f ea s i -
bilit y .A s tim e go e s to in￿ni ty , the pro c ess g e ne ra te db ya l lp l a y e rs ’ ad opt ing the
b est{ re ply rule con v erges to a n a bsor bing sta te (or s e to f states). U nder t h e pure
b est{ re ply pro c ess , ab sorbing state s do not ne cessa ri ly i n v ol v ec or e al lo c at i o ns.
How ever, if w e all ow the pla y ers to exp erimen t, i . e. dev i ate fro m the b est{ r eply
rule wi th a s m al l pro babil ity whene ver the re exis ts a p o te n tially b e tter o utc om e,
all absorbi n g sta te s wil l b e iden ti￿e d with core a l lo cations .
A m o del o f n on{co op e ra ti ve coa l itio n formation whic h is sim ilar i ns p i rit i s pre -
sente db yP erry and Ren y (19 94 ). Build i ng on a m o del b yK a l ai ,P ostlew aite an d
Rob e rts (19 78), P e rry a nd Ren y use a con ti no us tim e m o del where at e ac h p oint
in time a pla y er c an m a k e a prop osal c o nsisti ng o f a coali tion to whic h the pl ay er
w ould lik e to b el o ng a nd a pa y o ￿ all oc a t i o n fo r the m e mb er s o f that c o ali tion. If
the prop osal i s acc epted b y the m e mb er s o f the c o ali tion, these pla y ers dro p ou t
of the g ame and the rem aini ng pla y ers c on ti n ue ba rgaining. In e ￿ect, P erry a nd
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Thi s setup i s sim ilar t o m o dels of dyna m ic learning i n non{co op e rati veg am e sw i th lo cal
in t eracti on and p l ay er mo bilit y ,e . g .D ieckm ann (199 7).
2Reny asso ciate wi th ev ery c oo pe ra ti ve g ame with trans f e rab l e uti lit y a non co op-
erativ e seq uenti al ga m e an d s h o w that the stationary s ubga m e p erfect equil ibria
of this ga m e coninc i de with the core allo cations of the c oo pe ra ti ve g ame ,t h us pro-
vi ding a nonco op e ra ti ve m otiv ation fo r c or e al lo c at i o ns. Whi le P erry and Ren y
consider a o ne { sho t gam e, w e m o del a dynami c pro c ess of re p eated ba rgaining ,
and our soluti o n concept i s dynami c ra the r than static .
The artic le m o st c l osely related t ot h i sw o rk is Agas t ya (19 97). Agas t ya pre sen ts
ad y na m ic m o del of s o ci a l learning where, in eac h p erio d, eac h play er obs e rv es
a random sam ple of dem and v ec to rs dra w n from a ￿nite hi st o ry , a nd a djusts hi s
dem an d ac cording to a b e s t{repl y rule . Th i s rul e di￿ers fr o m the one u se di n
the presen t p ap er i n that pla y ers m ax i mi ze their exp ec te d pa y o ￿s, c o nditi o nal
on the probabilit y that thei r dem and i s com patibl e with a fe a sibl e all o cati on.
Agas t ya assum es tha t, whenev er there exists any s ubset o f pla y ers for whic ha
given de m a nd v ector is f ea si ble, its m embe rs receiv et h e ir resp e ctiv e dem a nds
with pro babil ity o ne. The p r o cess o f c oaliti on formatio n is not explici tly m od -
el ed. Under the rat her restrictiv ea s su m ption that the c haracteri st i c function i s
conv ex, A g ast y ad e r i v e s an isomorph i sm b e tw een the set o f a bso r bi ng states o f
the l earn i ng pro c e ss and the core o f the gam e. Our m o del de parts f ro m A g ast y a
in the ex plicit m o deli ng of endo genou s coali tion format ion : E achp l a y e r’s stra te gy
consists of the c hoice of a coa l i t i on as w e ll as his dem an d . F ur the r, the assum pt ion
of c on v e xit yw i th resp e ct to the c ha ra cte ristic func tion i s not needed.
Am o del o f e ndo geno us c o ali tion fo rm at i on i na d y na m i cc o n te xt is pro vi ded by
P ac kel (1 98 1). He de￿ne saM ar k o v pro c e s s o n the set o f out com es, i. e .p a y o￿
all o cations. Given the i ndividua l pre ferences o ver all o utc om e s, the tra nsiti on
prob abil ity from s tate x to state y is prop orti o nal to the n um be ro f m i nim al
coalit ion s that p re fer y to x . T he co re is then de￿ned b y the uni o n of th e a bsor bi ng
sta te s o f the pro ce ss . The stochastic solut io n of the pro cess is the probabi lit y
distri bu tion obtai ned b yl ettin g tim e go to i n￿ nity .I t f ol lows that, whene ver the
core i n no n{em pt y , the sto c ha sti cs o l ution places probabi lit y one on the set of core
all o cations. M or e o v e r, P ac kels h o ws tha t, if the strong core (i . e. the si ng l eton
set of undo m inated outcomes that can b e reac hed from e ver y oth e ro u t co m ew i th
p o siti v e probabi lit y) is no n{empt y , the s to c hastic so l ution pl ac e s probabi lit yo n e
on that s tate.
The m ai n di￿erence b et w een P ac kel’s m o del an d o ur o wn i st h a tP ac k e l abstrac ts
from b eha vi ou r rul e so nt he ind i vidual lev el , whil ew ee x plicitly m o del a ba r-
ga i ning pro ce ss b y whic h coali tions fo rm .T h us, o ur m o de l com bines A g ast y a’ s
app roac ho f m o del in g i nd ivi du al bargaini ng with P ac k el ’s approac ht o m o d e l e n-
dogenous c o ali tion fo rm at i on .
32 The M o del
Let N = f 1 ;: ::;n g de no te the set of p l a y ers. An y sub se t S ￿ N is called a
N
coalit ion . The se t of all no ne mp t y coa l itio ns 2 n f;g is de noted b y N .A g a m e
in c ha racteristic functi o n fo r mw i th trans f erab l e utilit y (or for s hort a T U {g ame)
is de￿ned b ya m a ppi ng v : N! R , the c ha r a cte risti c fun c tion. This functi on v
as so c iates with an y n onem ptyc o ali ti on the m ax i m al tota lp a y o ￿ for tha t co a lition.
Note t h at the pa y o￿ for a co al ition do e s not dep end o n the b e haviour o f o ther
coalit ion s. A v ect or o f pa yo￿s x =( x ;:::;x ), one fo r eac hp l ay er, i sc al led a n
1 n
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all o cation. An a l lo c at i on is fe asibl e for c o al ition S if x ￿ v ( S ).
i
i2 S
Usuall y , co o p erativ e g ame theory m ak es sev eral a ssum ptions on the c h aract eristic
functi o n, the m os t often em pl o yed are s up eradditi vit y a nd con vexit yo f v . A
c ha racte ristic function is sup e ra ddit ivei f f or a n yt w od i sjo i n t coali tions S and T
the follo wing rela ti on h o lds : v (S )+ v ( T ) ￿ v ( S [ T ), i. e . i f the m em be rs of S
and T unite , they can do a t le a st as w ell as b y rem aini ng s e pa rate. Co n vexit y ,
an ev en s tr o nger as sumption, is d e ￿ned as foll o ws : A c har ac teristic fun c ti on i s
conv ex i ff or a n yt w o coa l itio ns S and T : v ( S )+ v ( T ) ￿ v ( S [T )+ v ( S \T ).
P
If the c o op erativ e g ame is sup era ddi tiv e, an allo cation is c al le d fe asibl e ,i f x
i
i 2 N
￿ v ( N ), a nd it is e￿ c ien t if eq ua l ityh o l d s. Assum e that a n a l lo cation x has b e e n
prop osed. I f a g rou p of pla y ers c a n fo rm a coa l itio n w hi ch can sec ure its m embe rs
a higher pa yo￿ tha n the prop osed all o c ati o n, this c o ali tion wi ll blo c k the prop o sal.
P
F ormall y , the a l lo c at i on x wil lb eb l oc k ed b ya c o ali tion S if x< v ( S ). T hi s
i
i2 S
ide ai se m p l o y e db y the s oluti on con c e pt o f the core of a g a me , whic h is de￿ne d
b y the set of a l lf ea si ble all o cati o ns tha t ca nnot b e blo c k ed b ya n y coa l itio n. Tha t
is, an a l lo c at i on x isi n the c or e i f
X X
x = v ( N ) an d x ￿ v ( S ) 8 S ￿ N:
i i
i 2 N i 2 S
How ever, su p eradd itivit yo r c on v ex it y of the c haracteri stic function are q uite
restri ctiv er e qui rem ents. A sa n e xam ple , consider the foll o wi ng sim ple pro ducti on
ec o nom y . Supp o se th at e ac hp l a y er is e nd o w ed with ca pi ta l e , and endo wments
i
are trans forme di n to a si ng l eg o o d b y a real v alue d pro du c tion function f . If
P
w e de￿ne the c ha racteristic function b y v ( S )= f ( e ), s up e radditi vit y of the
i
i2S
c ha racte ristic func tion i m plies no n{decre as i n g retur ns t o scale.
In order to b e a bl e to deal with no n-sup e ra dditi v ec harac teris ti c functi o ns, w e
rede ￿n e the conce p ts of feasibi lit ya nd the core i n the fo llowi ng w a y .L e t C den ote
the set o f all p o ssible coa l itio n stru ct ur es, i. e. the set of all pa rti tions o f N with
at y pical coa l itio n s tr uc ture de no te db yC .W es a y that an a l lo cation is feas i ble if
the tota l pa yo￿ to the pla y ers d o es no t ex ceed the hi gh e s t p o ssibl e o utc om e, i. e.
the o utcom e that can b e ac hieved under the m ost fa v o urable coa l itio n s truc ture:
P P
x is feasibl ei f x ￿ m ax v ( S ).
i C 2C
i2N S 2 C
n
De ￿n i tion 1 F or any TU{g am e v ,a n a l l o c at i on x 2 R isa core a l lo cation if
4P P
( i ) x =m ax v ( S ) ,a n d
i C 2 C
i 2 N S 2 C
P
( ii ) x ￿ v (S ) 8 S ￿ N .
i
i2S
In w ords: Th e a l lo c at i on x i s feas i ble and e￿cien t, a nd there a re n o blo c ki ng
coalit ion s.
P




conditi on ( i ) of the de￿nition re du ce s to the fami lia r ex press i on x = v ( N ).
i
i2N
In o rde rt o e xclude the tri vial case that the c o re consists only o f the a l lo ca ti on
achieved b y all coa liti on s b ei ng s i ng l etons, i. e. x = v ( f ig ), w e a ssum e the fo l -
i
lowing :
Assu m ption 1 F or e ach p la y er i 2 N ,t h er ee x i s ts a c o alitio n S suc h that v ( S [
f ig ) >v ( S )+ v ( f i g ) .
Tha t is, fo r ev ery pla y er i ther ee xist s at l eas t o ne coali t ion where this pl ay er
ma k es a p ositi vec o n tri bu ti on , or sta te do t he rwise, the re a re no d um my pla y ers.
No o t he r restricti ons are imp osed o n the c h aracteri stic functi o n. In p arti cular, it
is not re quired tha t v b e s up eradditiv eo r e v e nc on v e x.
W en o w turn to the b e st{ re pl y pro ce ss b y whic hc o ali tions ev olve. E ac hp l ay er
i ’ s strategic v ar i ab l es are his co al i tion c hoice and hi s dem and d ,i . e. the s h are
i
of t h e surpl u s generated b y v he aspires to get.
Tim e is discre te. I n eac h p erio d t , all p l a yers a nnou nc e thei r resp e ctiv ed e m a nds,
and the a l lo c at i on is det erm i ned in a w a y to b e descri b e d s hortly . Realize d
pa y o￿ s d e pe n d on the c om p ati bi lit y of the indivi dua l dem ands in eac hc o a l it ion.
The all o cati on in p erio d t + 1 is dete rm i ned as follo ws. I f the dem ands withi na
coalit ion S a re feasible, eac hm embe ro f S wi ll rec eiv eh i sd e m and. Othe rw i se ,
2




d if d ￿ v ( S )
i i
i2S
x = (1 )
i
:
v ( f i g ) o ther wi se .
Th us, a pla y er’s re serv ation pa y o￿ c an b e i n t erpreted a s a di sa gree me n t o utc om e:
If negotiations fa il i n the sense tha t the m em b ers of a coa liti on are un able to a gree
up on the division o f the s urpl us , eac h ha s to fall ba c ku p o nh i so wn resou rc es.
W es a y tha t the dem a nd vec to r d =( d) i s fe as ib le g iven c o al ition structu r eC
ii 2 N
P
if d ￿ v ( S ) for al l S 2 C .
i
i2 S
Ap l a y e rs opp ortun ityt o r evis e h i s s trategy arises at ra ndom . Ine a c hp e rio d
t , eac hp l a y e ri ndep e ndentl yt a k es a rand om dra wf ro m a Be rnoull i trial. Wi th
3
prob abil ity ￿ 2 (0 ; 1) , th e dra w pro d uc es the outco m e \a djust". If this hap p e ns,
the p l a yer adjus ts hi s curren t stra te gy as f o l lows . He o bserv es the prev ail i ng
2
In wha t follo ws , th e sup e rscript t is o m i tte d i n orde r to s im plify no ta tion.
3
N￿ ol de k ea nd Sam uelson (19 93) re f e r to thi se v en t as \receivi ng the learn dr a w".
5t t t t
coalit ion struc tu r e C 2C ,a sw e ll a s the dem an d v ect or d =( d ;::: ;d ). O n
1 n
the bas i s of this in formation, the pl a yer dec ides whethe r to j oi na n y of the e xi st i ng
t
coalit ion s S 2 C or to form a si n gle to n c o ali tion, and s i m ul tan e a ously announce s
t+1
his dem and d .T h i sd e term i nes the coa l itio n stru c ture a nd the dem a nd fo r the
i
nex t p erio d. The s tate of the g ame at eac hp o i n t in tim e is t he refore c h aracteri ze d
t t t
b y the the tupl e ! =( C; d ).
T ok e ep m atters as s i mp l e as p os si bl ea nd to a void problem s concernin g the
ex istence o f b est r eplies, w er e s tri c t the pla y ers’ de ma nd s t o be c ho sen fro ma
￿nite set. Supp o se there is a smallest accoun ti ng un i t ￿ wi th 0 <￿ < 1, an d ￿
su￿ci en tl y small .
Assu m ption 2 Each player’ s demand is r estricte d t o the ￿n it e se t D of al l
i
P
inte gr al multiple so f ￿ in t h e c lose d in terval l [v ( i) ; ma x v ( S )] .
C 2C
S 2 C
F or eac h sta te of the g ame ! ,p l a y e r i ’s stra te g y set i s denoted b y
￿( ! ): = f ( S; d ) j S =S [f i g fo r som e S 2 C [f ; g ;d 2 D g :
i i i i i i
As the n umbe r o f p o s si ble co al itions a nd coali tion struct ur esa s w el l as the p ossi ble
dem a nds are a l l ￿ni te, w ea r ed e al ing w ith a ￿nite stra te g y spa c e. Th us, the
notions of fe a sibi lit ya n d e ￿ ciency, and the refore the d e ￿nition o f a core a llo ction,
ha v et o b em o d i ￿e d.
n
De ￿n i tion 2 F or any TU{g am e v ,a n a l l o c at i on x 2 R isa core a l lo cation if
P P
( i ) x 2 D 8 i 2 N , x ￿ ma x v ( S ) , and if the in e q ualit y is
i i i C 2C
i2N S 2 C
P




( ii ) x ￿ v (S ) 8 S ￿ N .
i
i2S
In wha t foll o ws , the te rm \co r ea l lo c at i on " wi ll refer to de ￿n ition 2 .
The p l a yers are m y op i c. Ap l ay er who is se lected to m o ves e e ks to m ax im i ze
his exp ec ted pa y o￿ fo r the next p erio d, conditi o nal o n fe asibil ity .F urther, the
play ers ha v e a dapt ivee xp ectations. Ea c hp l a y e r, when i ti s his turn to a djust hi s
stra t eg y , exp ects the c urren t coa l it i o n structure a nd the de m an ds o f the o ther
play ers to pre v ai l in the ne xt p e rio d. N o te that, if ￿ , the probabi lit y of getti ng
the opp ortunit y to adjust, is s m al l, the s e exp ectations a re \ alm o st" r at i o nal: If ￿
is smal l, the pro ba bilit y tha t t w o pla y ers revise thei r s tra te gi es at a ti m e is cl o se
to z ero.
The pl a yers ’ c ho i c e o f coa l itio n m em b ership i s restricted b y the curren t coalition
structure. Gi v e na n y coa l itio n s tr uc ture C , the pla y er fa c es thre e options :( i )
he c a n sta yi nh i s prese n t coa l itio n, ( ii ) he can jo i na n y o f the other c o ali ti ons
S 2 C ,o r ( i ii ) he can fo rm the single to n c o ali tion f i g (i f this i sd i ￿eren t fro m
( i )) . At this p oin t, co ordination pro blems m a y arise due t o incom patibi lit yo f
play ers’ pl a ns. F or insta nc e, supp os ei ns o m e p erio d t,p l a y er i is formi ng the
6single to n c o ali ti on f i g, but pl a ns to join som e coa l itio n S in t + 1 , while another
play er, j , plans to join f i g in t +1 . N o w, i f b oth i and j ge t the c hance to adjus t
thei r strategies a t the sa m et i m e, the i r plans wil l b e inc ompatibl e. T o solv e thi s
prob l em ,w e a ssum e tha t eac h play er, w hen h e gets the c ha nce to m o v e, can
alwa ys l eav e his cu rre n t coali tion a nd join the co al itio n of his c ho i ce, but no
play er can b e force d to sta yi na n y coa l ition. T hat i s, pl a yer i will join S ,a n d j
wil l end up in the si ngle to n coali tion fj g .I f c o ali tions are i n terpre ted a s ￿rm s,
the a ssum pti on i mp l ies tha t em pl o yees c a n quit (a nd jo i n another ￿rm ) witho u t
notice . Ana l ternativ ei n terpret at i on w ould b e to ima gine th at coali tions form
at certain \mee tin g p oin ts", i . e. di￿eren tl o cati o ns, o r cl ubs , where all pl a yers
as se mbled at the sa m e lo ca ti on fo rm a c oa l itio n. A pl a yer who w an ts to jo i na
coalit ion h as to g o to tha t c o ali tion’ s m e e t i ng po i n t. In the a b o ve exam pl e, thi s
me a ns that i w ould g o to the m eeting p oin t of coalit ion S , a nd at the sa m et i me
j w ould g o to the l o c ation formerly o cc upied b y i, whic h he wil l ￿nd de se rted.
This assum ption en sures that the co al ition structure in ea c h p erio d i sa l w a ys well
de￿ned.
As a my op i cm ax i mi z er, the pla y er c ho o ses that coali tion wh i c h pro m ises hi m the
highest feasibl ep a y o￿. H is dem an d is the nd e term ined b y his m axim um e xp ect e d
pa y o ￿ giv en the oth er pla y ers’ dem an d s , i . e .
X
d ( ! )= ma x v ( S [f i g ) ￿ d s. t. d 2 D; (2 )
i j i i
S 2C [f; g
j 6=i
j 2 S
and the c hos e nc o a l ition S ( ! ) is o ne i nw h i c hd ca n b e ac hiev ed, giv en the
i i





S ( ! ) 2 arg ma x v ( S [f i g ) ￿ d : (3 )
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If thi sc o a l ition i s not uni que, the p l a yer ra ndom i zes, c ho os i ng e ac h o f the m ax -
imiz ing coa l itio ns with p os i tiv e pro bab i lit y .H o w ever , w e a ssum e tha t a pl ay er
switc hes co al itio ns o nl y if his m axi mum e xp ected pa y o ￿ fro m do i n g so stric tly
ex ceed s his curren tp a y o￿, i .e . i f d ( ! ) >x .
i i
Given the ￿ni te strategy sp ace , the i nd i vi d ual adapta ti o n rul es de￿ne a ￿ni te
Mark o vc ha i n with s t a te spa ce ￿ = f ! =( C; d )jC 2C ;d 2￿ D g .L e t S ( i )
i 2 N i
denote the coa l itio n p l a yer i be l o n g s t o i n a n y sta te ! .T h et ra nsiti o n proba bi lit y
0 0 0













as de￿ned in (2 ), an d S ( i )i sa m ax im i ze r o f (3 ). I n wha t fol lows , wew i ll refer
to thi sM ar k o vc h ain as the b est{reply p r o c es s .
As coa l itio n structures ev ol v eo v er time, it is in te resting to a naly s e under wha t
conditi o ns the pro cess wil l settl ed o wn to a stable c o ali tion structure, wh er en o
7play er has a n i ncen ti v et o s w i tc ha n ym or e . T o this purp os e, w ee m pl o y the
conce p t of ergo dic sets.
0
0
De ￿n i tion 3 As et E￿ ￿ is erg o di c if for a ny ! 2E , ! = 2E , p =0 ,a nd no
!!
non empty pr op er sub set of E has this pr op erty. S ingl eton er go dic se ts ar ec al l e d
abs orbing s tates ,i . e . ! 2 ￿ is a bso r bi ng if p =1 .
!!
Ergo dic sets a re th us m i nim al s e ts wit h the pro p ert y tha t, once the pro c ess has
en tered suc h a set, it wil lr e m ain in that s e tf o r e v e r a fte r, and the pro c ess w i ll
p erp e tua l ly v ac illate b et w een the st ates in the ergo di c set. A s table coali ti on
structure will e volvei f the pro ce ss reac hesas i ng l eton ergo di c set, a n a bs orb i ng
sta te .I n an absorbi ng sta te , no pla y e r has an i ncentiv e to rev ise his s trategy ,g i v e n
the prev ail ing c oa lition structure . The foll owing le m m a c harac terizes a bsorb i ng
sta te s.
L e mma 1 A st ate ! =( C; d ) is a na b s orbin g st a t e of the b e st{r epl y pr o c ess if
and only if the fol l owin g t hr e ec on di t ions ar e met :
( i ) d = x ￿ v (f i g ) 8 i 2 N ,
i i
P








( i ii ) 8 i 2 N : 69 S 2C :v ( S [f i g ) ￿ j 6 = i d >x .
j i
j 2 S
Pr o of. Co ndi tion ( i) sta te s that the a l lo c at i o n corresp onding to the sta te eq ua l s
the dem and v ec to r. This is the case if a nd o nl yi fd e m and s a re fe a sibl e, cl early a
nec ess ary conditi o n for the state b e i ng absorbi ng . F urther, e ac hp l a y e rm ust get
at le a st hi s reserv ation pa y o￿ , o r e ls e he w ould de viate fro m the state b y for mi ng
as i ng l eton c o ali tion.
Co ndi tion ( ii ) sta tes tha t the all oc a t i o n withi ne ac hc o a l itio n i sf e a sibl e and
e￿ cien t. If the sum o f the dem a nds fell s hort o f v ( S ), at le ast o ne m embe r
of the coali tion could increa se his de m and without a￿ecti ng feasibilit y ,u n l ess
the di ￿erence b e tw ee n v ( S ) a nd the tot al de m a nd i ss m al le r tha n the s m al le s t
accoun ti n g unit ￿ .
Fi na l ly ,( iii ) ensures th at no pl a yerh a s a ni ncentiv e to switc h coa l itio ns . Whi le
each of these cond i tions i s nec essa ry for a n a bsorbing st ate, the three c on d itions
tog e ther are su￿c ie n t: If a l l thre e conditi o ns are m et, no pl a yer can p ossib ly g ai n
b yd e viating fro m that sta te . 2
Absorbing states th us re presen ti nd ivi d uall y sta bl ee q u i libria i nt he d e￿nition o f
Green be rg (19 94 ).
83 Existence of Abs o rbing States
The foll o wing theo r em pro vi des a su ￿ ci entc o ndi tion fo r th e existence o f a n ab-
so rbi ng sta t e.
P
Theorem 1 If v ( N ) ￿ v ( f i g ) ,t h eb est{re ply p r o c ess has at l e ast one ab-
i2N
sor b ing state .
Pr o of. An absorbi ng sta te is co nstructe da s f o l lows: Assu m e that the grand
coalit ion fN g has fo rm ed an d e ac h play er rec ie vs a pa y o￿ x ￿ v ( f i g )w i th
i
P
x = v ( N ). A sp a y o￿s a re indi vidually ra tional, no p l a y er has a n incen ti ve
i
i2N
to f o rm the si ng l et o n coali tion. F urther, as all p l a yers are m e mb ers o f the g rand
coalit ion , there i s no other co al itio n to jo i n. Fi n all y , as the dem ands sum up to
v ( N ), no pl ay er c an increase his dem a nd. Thus, under the c o ndi tion o f the the -
N
orem , eac he lemen t of the set ￿ ( v ): = f ! =( C; d ) jC = f N g;d ￿ v ( f i g ) 8 i 2
i
P




The set ￿ is th e set o f states i n volving the g rand coa l itio n w he re all pla y ers’
dem a nds are indi vi uall yr a t i o nal, an d the dem an d ve ctor i s feasibl e and e ￿c i ent
N
given f N g . T hat is, the set of a l lo c at i o ns a sso c iated w i th ￿ is th e s e t of all
e￿ cien t im putatio ns ac hi ev able b y the gra nd coa l itio n. Stated otherwi se ,as u ￿ -
ci en t conditi on f o r an absorbi n g s tat et o e xist is that th e gam e is essen ti al i n the
de￿ni tion X .2.6 o f Ow en (19 95).
It is w el l kno wn fro m the theo ry o f ￿ ni te M ar k o vc ha i ns tha t, a s ti m e tends
tow ards in￿nit y , th e pro c ess con v erges to an ergo dic set wi th pro babil ityo ne,
4
ir resp e ctiv e of the initial state. How ever, the b est{ r e ply pro cess considere d here
typically exhibit s m ultiple abs orbing states a nd/or er go dic sets, a nd whi cho f
these wi ll e ven tua lly b e reac hed de p e nds on t h e initial s ta te in whic h the pro c ess
sta rt s . As th e ti tl e o f this p ap er sugge s ts, we are in te re sted i n deri vi ng c o ndi tions
under wh i c h the pro c ess con v erges to w a rds s t a tes in volv ing c o re all o cations. W e
are no wg o i ng to exp lore the re lations hi pb e t w e en abs orb ing states an d the c ore
of a g ame .
Cle ar l y ,i f x is a c o re all o cation, ev e ry sta te ! =( C; d )w i th d = x where d is
feasibl eg i v en C m us t b e absorbi ng : C onditi on ( i ) o f de￿nitio n 1 implies ( i ) and
( ii )o f l em m a 1, a nd th e non {ex istence of blo c king coa l it i on s ( c o nditi on ( ii )o f
de￿ni tion 1) im pl ies conditi on ( ii i )o f l em m a1 .
How ever, the con v e rse is not true , a s the follo wing ex am p l es s how.
Ex am ple 1: Let N = f 1; 2 ; 3 g ,an d v ( f i g ) = 2 fo r all i 2 N , v ( S ) = 5 for j S j =2 ,
and v ( N )=8 . The sta te ! =( f N g ; (4 ; 2; 2) )i s abs orbing, bu t the a l lo ca ti on
x =( 4 ; 2 ; 2) is no t in the core since co re a l lo c at i on s must s a ti sfy x ￿ 2: 5.
i
Ex am ple 2: The 3{pl a yer ma jority g ame. N = f 1; 2 ; 3 g , v ( f i g) = 0 for all
i 2 N , and v ( S )= 1 0 f or j S j￿ 2. T he c or e i se mp t y , b ut an y sta te ! =( f N g ;d )
4
E. g. K emen y and Sne ll (197 6), Theorem 3. 1.1 on p. 43 .
9P
with d =1 0 i s abs orb ing. In ad di tion to ab sorbing s tates, thi se xa m ple
i
i2N
ex hibits non {sing le to n ergo di c sets. Th i s is the cas e if the pro c ess starts in a
sta te w he re o ne of the pla y ers re ceiv e s the e n tire s urpl u s of 10, e. g.
1
! = ( ff 1 ; 2g ; f 3gg ; (10 ; 0 ; 0))
2
! = ( ff 1 g ; f2 ; 3gg ; (10 ; 10 ; 0))
3
! = ( ff 1 g ; f2 ; 3gg ; (0 ; 10 ; 0))
4
! = ( ff 1 ; 3g ; f 2gg ; (0 ; 10 ; 10))
5
! = ( ff 1 ; 3g ; f 2gg ; (0 ; 0; 1 0))
6




The transiti on s b e t w e en the s tates ar ee ￿ e cted a s foll o ws . I n ! , only pla y er 2 i s
not pl aying a b est reply .T h us, if pla y er 2 gets the c ha nce to a djust, he w i ll joi n
2
play er 3 to fo rm the coa l itio n f 2 ; 3 g , a nd de ma nd d =1 0 . I f a n y of the other t w o
2
play ers get the c ha nc e to adjus t, they will not c ha nge the ir strategie s. Th e refore,
2 1 2
! is con struct ed from ! b y pla y er 2’s st rategy ad j u stm ent. In ! ,p l a y er 1 ’ s
dem a nd is no t feasi bl e fo r the c o ali ti on f 1g .P l a y er 1’s b e st r e pl y is to adju st hi s
dem an d t o z ero , and s t ay in the single to n c o ali tion. Pla y ers 2 and 3 a re pla yi ng
2 3 2
b est re plies in ! . T he new s tate ! ist h u s o btaine d from ! b y adjusting pl ay er
3
1’s dem and. In ! , the only pla y er who do e s not pla ya b e st r e ply i sp l a y e r3 . I f
he g e ts the c hance to a djust, he wi ll jo in pl a yer one to f o rm the coa l itio n f1 ; 3g ,
4 5
and dem an d d =1 0 . T h is le a ds to ! , and s o fo rth.
3
1
Once thi s set i se n tered, the pro cess w i ll f o rev er \cyc le ", i .e . v isit the st a te s !
6
to ! in a ￿xe d order. H o w ever, du e to th e sto c has ti c na ture of the adjus tm ent
pro c ess , the s tates a re not v isited at re gu l ar i n terv als of time. F or insta nc e,
1 2
switc hing from ! to ! req ui res th at p l a yer 2 gets the opp or tunit y to a djust hi s
stra t eg y ,a ne v e n t tha t o c curs w i th pro babil it y ￿ .A s a cons e quence, the pro c ess
1
mi gh t rem ai n in sta te ! for sev eral p er i o ds, un ti lp l a y e r 2 is able to adjus t , and
the n um be r o f p erio ds the pro c ess sta y s in eac h sta te is ra ndom .
Th us, us i ng the pure b e s t{repl y rule describ e da b o v e, the pro c ess m i gh t get
trapp ed in a domi na ted a l lo c at i o n, o r in a \cyc le". S i mi l ar phenomena ha v eb e e n
obs e rv ed in o the rc o n te xts, e. g. in the theory o f con v enti o ns where i t could b e
sho wn ( c f. Be rn i ng haus and Sc h w al b e (1996), Y oung (19 93 )) th at a p op ul at i o n
of pla y ers wi ll a do pt an ine ￿cien t con ven ti o n, in proble m s concerning the c ho i ce
of a tec hno l og y a s i nA rth ur (1 989), or in the theory o f the core of a n exc hange
ec o nom y when trad e i sr e s tri cte dt o a b i lateral ex change as i nF e ldm an ( 19 7 3 ).
W ew i ll nows l ightl ym o d i fy the pla y er s’ adaptati o n rul eb ya l lowing them to
ex pe r im e n tw i th (m y op i cally) su b opt im al strategies.
104 Best Reply w ith Ex p erim en tat i on
Supp ose the system ha s en tered an a bso rb i ng state that is no t i n the core. Tha t
is, there exis ts a bl oc king coa l itio n whic h cann ot b e realized due to the cur ren t
coalit ion structure. F or instance, i ne x am pl e1 , p l a y e r s2a n d3c ou l d secur e
them se lves a pa y o ￿ of 5 , but the coa l it i on f 2 ; 3 g cann ot b e realized b ecause,
according to the rule s o f the g ame , the pla y ers c an sw itc ho n l yb e t w een exis ti ng
coalit ion s, or for m a single to n coa l it i on .
Now, i fw e assum e tha t the c haracteri st ic functi o n is co m mo n k no wledg e amon g
the pl a yers , e ac hp l a y er i sa w a re of the fact that a blo c ki ng c o ali tion ex ist s. Whi le
play ers 2 and 3 w ou l dw an tt o f o r m t h i sc o ali tion, the ab senc eo f c om m unica ti on
p o ssibi liti es pre v ents them fro m d oi n g so . T he o nly w a yt o m ak ei t p ossi ble
for the coa l itio n f 2; 3g to form w ould b e for o ne of the t w op l a y e rs to form a
5
single to n c o ali ti on, sa y f 2g , a nd hop e th at pl a yer 3 wi ll jo i n in the n e xt p er i od .
This, ho w ever, c on tradic ts o ur as sumpti o n that pla y ers sw i tchc o a l itions o nl yi f
they exp ec t a s tri ct l y greater pa y o￿ . W en o w m o dif y the m o del b ya l lowing the
play ers to s wi tc ht o m y op i cally sub o pti m al strategie s (with a sm al l probabi lit y)
whenev er the y are a m e mb er of a p oten ti all y blo c king coa l itio n that canno t b e
reac hed u nde r the pre v ai lin g coa l itio n structure.
0
Assu m ption 3 In any s t ate ! =( C; d ), whe n ever the r e exists a c o al ition S = 2 C
P
0 0




and t akes e ac h str ate gy ( S; d ) 2￿( ! ) w ith pr ob ability ￿= j￿( ! ) j whe n he gets the
i i i i
opportunit y to r evise his str at e gy . T he pr ob abil ity ￿ is indep endent acr oss players
and states.
In w o rds, a pl a yerc ho oses an y com bination o f c o ali tion a nd d e m and wi th p ositi ve
but small pro babil it y . Cho osing m y opicall y sub optim a l stra te gi es with a s m all
prob abil ityc an b e i n terpre ted as ex p erime nting on the p art of the pla y ers. Exp e r-
imen ti ng ena bl es a pla y er to destabil ize a s tate i n v ol vi n g a dominated all o cation,
at the cost of a los s in pa y o￿. This is si m ila r to the concep t o f \trem bles", o r
6
\mutations" used i n ev olutionary m o del s, wh i c hi s often i n terpret ed a s exp eri-
me n ting. Th e di ￿e re nce b e tw ee n our m o d e ling o f exp erim e n ts a nd ev ol utiona ry
m uta ti o ns is that, i n our case, the pl a yers ex p erim e n ti f and only if there ex i sts
an outcome tha t i s p oten tially b ette r for them , whereas m utations o c cur i na n y
sta te with u ni fo r m probabi lit y .W eb e l iev ei t i s reaso na ble to a ssum e th at pl a yers
wil l b e inc lin e dt o e xp e rim e n t only i f there i sa c ha nce tha t the outcome o f the
ex pe r im e n tm a ye v en tu al ly impro vet h e ir situation.
W e wil l ref er to the b est{ re ply pro c ess m o di￿e db y a ssum ption 3 as the b est{reply
pr o c e ss with exp erimen tation . Cle ar l y , states i n v ol vi ng domi na te d dem an d ve ctors
5
Of c ourse, this w oul d re qui r e the p l ay e r to l oo k f orw ard a t l e ast t wo p erio ds .
6
E. g. K a nd o ri et al. (19 93).
11canno t b e a bsorb i ng s tates of thi s p ro cess, s i nce th e re i sap o s i tiv e probabi lit y
that a pla y er exp er i me n ts . A sar esu l t, w e get the foll o wi ng theorem .
Theorem 2 The se t of demand v e ctors ass o ciated w ith an ab so rbin g stat e of the
b est{re ply p r o c es s with exp erimen tation c oinc id e s wit h the set of c or ea l l o c ation s:
( i ) If x is a c or ea ll o c ation , t hen al l ! =( C; d ) with d = x an d d b eing feasib le
giv en C ar e absor b ing state s.
( ii ) If ! =( C; d ) is an ab s orbin g st ate, then d is a c or ea l l o c ation.
Pr o of. P art ( i )i s o b vi ou s: If x = d isi n t h e core, no pla y er c a n gain e ither
b y switc hing c o ali tions or b yc hangi ng his d e m and. Moreo v er, a s no blo c ki ng
coalit ion s ex ist, no pl a yere xp e rime n ts. Th us , the s tat ei s abs orbing.
P art ( ii ): Supp ose ! =( C; d )i s absorbi n g, but d is no t in the core. I f d is no t
P
a core a l lo cation, th e re ex ists a c oa l i tion S wi th v ( S ) > d . Assum ption 3
i
i2 S
implies tha t a l l i 2 S ex pe rim e n t with p r o babili t y ￿ . Th us, there i s a p ositi ve
prob abil ity tha t the sta t e is left, a c on tradic tion to ! b ei n g a bsorbing. 2
It i s cl ear t h at the s e t of a bsorbing st ates o f the pro ce s s with exp erim en ta ti o n is a
subs e t of the set of absorbi ng s t a tes o f the pure b e s t{repl y pro cess. T he foll o wi ng
ex am pl e illustrates th e th e or e m.
Ex am ple 3: Supp ose the n umb er of pla y er s n is e ven, v ( f ig ) = 0, a nd v ( S )=
j S j + 2 for a l l S ￿ N wi th j S j￿ 2. He re the o pti ma l c o ali tion s ize, i .e . the
n um be ro f m e m b ers that m axim izes the (a v erag e) p er cap i ta pa y o￿ i s j S j =2 .
The unique c o re all o cation is x =2 f o r a ll i 2 N .
i
Note tha t, if a pl a yer’s curre n tp a y o ￿ is l ess tha n o ne, a nd the re are at l eas t
tw o coali tions , hi s b e st r e ply wil lb et o s w i tc hc o ali tions and dem and a pa y o￿ of
N
one. T hus , the s e t o f abs orbing s tates of the b est{reply pro cess is ￿ ( v ) [f ! =
P
N
( C; d )jj S j￿ 2 ; d = v ( S ) 8S 2C; d ￿ 1 8 i 2 N g , where ￿ ( v )i s de￿ne d
i i
i2S
as i n the pro of o f theorem 1 . Th e s e to f a bs orbing sta te s of the pro c ess wi th
ex pe r im e n tation i s the subset o f s tat es w he re pl a yers fo rm pairwi se co ali tions
and de m and 2, i .e . f ! =( C; d )jj S j =2 8 S 2C; d =2 8 i 2N g . The c om mo n
i
dem an d ve ctor of these sta te sc oi ncid e s with the core all o cation of the g ame .
5 Con v ergence to Abs o rbi ng States
Theorem 2 states tha t, i f the core i s no n{empt y , eac hc o r e a l lo cation can b e
reac hed i n an absorbi ng s tate, and an y abs orbing state can b e a sso ci a te d wit h a
core a l lo c at i on . How ever, the t he or e md o e s no t g uaran te e th at a c or e al lo ca ti on
wil l actuall yb er e a c hed by the pro c ess . While the theory of M ar k o vc ha i ns
provi des a resul t th at ensures con v er gence t ow a rds a n e rg o di c set, i td o e sn o t
guaran tee that suc ha s e t b e single to n, i. e. an a bsorbing sta te (see exam pl e 2).
12The fo l lowing theorem excludes the p o ss i bilit y that the pro cess gets \ t ra pp ed"
in an e rg o dic set ot he r th an a n abs orbing s tate.
Theorem 3 If the c or e is non {empty, the b e st{r epl y pr o c e ss wit h e xp erime nta tion
wil l c on verge t o an ab sor bin g state wi th prob ability one as t i me tends tow ar ds
in￿ nity.
Pr o of. W e pro v e the re su l tb y sho wing tha t all ergo dic s e ts a re s i ng l etons . Sup-
p o se that the re exists an e rg o dic set E￿ ￿ with jE j ￿ 2. W ee s t a b l ish a con-
tradictio n b ys h o w ing that E contains a sta t e from w hi ch there is a path to an
abs orbing s tate.
Theorem 2 e n sures that no ne o f the sta te si n E i n v ol v e a core allo cation. (T hi s
foll o w s fro m the fa ct tha t all core all o cations are rea c hed in a n a bsorbing s tate,
and ergo dic s e ts a re m i nim al ,i .e .c a nnot con tain other e rg o d i cs e ts . ) Asa
consequenc e, eac h s tate ! =( C; d ) 2E is c haracteri zed b y th e exis te nce of a
P
coalit ion S = 2 C with v ( S ) > d . T hat i s, t h e re are som e pla y e rs who
i
i2 S
wil le x p erim e n t wi th s ub op ti m al stra tegies if the yg e t the c hance to a djust their
stra t eg i es. There i s a p ositi ve p roba bi lit y that a l l the se pl a yers get the c ha nc et o
adjus t i ns o m e p erio d t , and no other pl a yerg e ts this c ha nce . Moreo ver, ther e i sa
p o siti v e probabi lit y tha t all pla y er s w ho exp erimen tf o rm the si ng l eton coalition
and dem and thei r re serv ation pa y o￿ , i .e . the y pic k the st rateg y ( f i g;v ( f i g )).
Th us, all states re su l ting from an y ! 2E b y replacing S ( i ) with S nf i g and add i ng
f ig in C and replacing d wi th v ( f ig )f o ra l l pla y ers i who e xp e rimen t with the
i
single to n co al iti on c a n b e reac hed wi t h p ositi ve probabi lit y fro m ! . Deno te the
set of all suc h stat es by R ( ! ). I t foll ows that [ R ( ! ) ￿E ,s i nce a l l states i n
! 2 E
that set are reac he dw i th p os i tiv e pro babil ity .
By the sam e arg um e n ta s a b o v e ,e l e m e n ts of R ( ! ) cann ot in v olve core a l lo c at i o ns.
Rep eating the sa m e pro cedure as b ef or e , replacing E b y R( ! )f o r eac h ! 2E i n
2
the a rgumen t, w e get a set R ( ! ) for e ac h ! 2E . A g ain, the u ni on of a l l the
2
R ( ! )m ust b e i n E .
It is cl ear that, af ter re pe at i ng thi s pro ce d ure a ￿n i te n umbe r k of t i me s , the set
k
[ R ( ! ) con tains th e state where e ither ( a ) eac h play er for m s the si ng l eton
! 2E
coalit ion , or ( b ) s ome pla y ers form si ngle to n c o ali tions, and tho se w ho are not i n
a singleton c o ali tion are pl a ying b est repl ie s a nd ha v en o i ncen ti v et o e x pe rim e n t.
(If these pla y ers do not p l a ya b e s t rep l y , the re i sap o s i tiv e p robabili ty that these
play ers (and n o oth er pla y ers) get the opp ortunit y to a djust. ) More prec ise l y , E
0 0 0 0
contains a state ! =( C; d )w i th the foll owing pro p ert y: Ei ther S ( i)= f i g and
0 0 0
d = v ( f ig ) fo r all i 2 N , o r, if there are c oa l itio ns S 2 C with j S j￿ 2, the n
i
c c c 0 c c c
there exists a n abs o rbi n g state ! =( C; d ) suc h that S = S for so m e S 2 C ,
0 c 0 0 0
and d = d for a l l i 2 S , for a l l S with jS j￿ 2 .( A s the c o re is no n{em pt y ,
i i
0
an a bsorbing s t a te exis ts. F urther, a sm e m b ers of S pl a y b est re pl ie s a nd do no t
ex pe r im e n t, thei r dem ands m us t b e pa rt of a core all o cati on.)
130 c c c
Starting from ! , an abs orbing sta t e ! =( C; d ) can b e re ac he d i n o ne step.
c
F or eac h i 2 N ,w e denote b y S ( i) the coa l itio n i b el o ngs to i nt h e a bsorb i ng
t 0
sta te . Supp ose t h e pro c ess i s in sta te ! = ! . W en o w con stru cta v ec to r o f
t +1 c
mo v es o n the p art o f the pla y ers that yi e lds ! = ! . Assu m pti on 1 e ns ure s
0
that, in s tate ! ,f o re ac hp l a y e r who fo rm s the s i ng l eton c oali tion, there ex i sts
a p oten ti ally b e tter coa l itio n, a nd th us eac h i wi th S ( i )= f i g exp erim en ts w i th
0
prob abil ity ￿ .F u rthe r, a l l pla y ers w ho are in a non{si ng l eton c o ali tion in ! do
c c c
not ex pe rim e n t. N o w ! can b e reac he d as foll o ws . F o r eac h T 2 C ,￿ x o n e
c c c
play er i wi th S ( i )= T .C a l l thi sp l a y e r i ( T ). No ws u p p o s e a l l pla y ers who are
in a si ng l eton c oa l i tion get the opp or tunit yt o a djust thei r strategie s , a nd tha t
m
all the se pl a y e rs e xp e rimen t. This ha pp ens w i th p r o babilit y( ￿￿ ) , where m is
0
the n um b er o f singleton c o ali tions in ! . The exp erim en ti ng pla y ers c ho ose the
c c
foll o wi ng s t ra te gi es. Eac hp l a y er i ex p erim e n ts with S = S ( i)a n d d = d:F or
i i
i
c c c c
every coa l itio n T 2 C , the pl ay er i ( T )s t a ys i n the singlet on coalit ion f i ( T ) g
c c c
and dem ands d .A ll o ther pla y ers j 2 T joi n the coali tion f i ( T ) g, a nd de m and
i
c c 0 m
0 c




where j￿( ! ) j = j C j j D j i s the n um b er of s tra te gi es av ai lable to pl a yer i ins t a te
i i
0 c
! (there are jC j coa litions to c ho ose fr om ) .T h us, there i sap o s i tiv e probabi lit y
0
that an abs orbing s tate is re ac hed w he n the system s t a rts i n state ! .T h i si sa
0
contradic tion to ! b eing an e lemen to f a n e rg o di cs e t. It fo l lows that a l l ergo dic
sets a re si ng l eton s, whi ch com ple tes the pro o f . 2
Theorem s 2 and 3 tog e ther ensure that, i f the core o f a g ame is no n{empt y ,
the b est{reply pro cess with e xp e rime n tation will reac ha c or e al lo c at i on w ith
prob abil ity o ne as ti m e go e st oi n￿nit y ,n om a tte r where the pro cess s tarts.
6 Con clusion
This pap er prop o sed a dynamic pro c ess of e ndo genous coa l itio n formation i n
co o p erativ e g ame s . C oaliti on m e mb er ship a nd dem ands in eac hp e rio d are de -
term ined b y a sim pl e ad aptation rul et h a t i s based o n m yopic b est repl ies o n the
part o f the pla y ers, and p l a yers exp er i me n tw i th s ub o pti m al strategies whenev er
there i sac han c e tha t this m igh t le a d to a pre ferred coali t ion structure. Un der
v ery m ild c o nditi on s c o n c erning the c h aracteri stic functio n (t h e ga m e b ei ng es-
senti a l is su￿c ient), abs orbing sta te s a re s ho wn to exis t. M or e o v e r, if the core i s
non {em pty , the pro ce ss will con v erge to a sta te i n volvin g a c o re all o cation wi th
prob abil ityo n e .
The i dea to apply dyna m ic learning pro ce ss e st o c o o p erativ e g ames i s quite no vel.
The new as p ec ti n tr o duced i n th e prese n t pap er is the e xpl i ci t fo rm ulati on ofa
bargaini ng pro ce s s tha t sim ultaneou sly deter m ine s the coa l itio n structure and
the all o cation in e ac ht im e p erio d. Th is form ul at ion all o ws us to di sp ense w i th
restri ctiv e a ssum pti o ns on the c harac teris ti cf un c tion suc h a s sup e ra ddi tivit yo r
14conv exit y , whic h i n turn ensures that our m o d e l is app l ic a bl et o a l a rge class o f
ga m es.
Whil ew e pro vide a s trong c on v ergenc e result fo r the cas e tha t the core i s non {
em pty , relativ el y l ittle can b e said i f the core i se mp t y .I nt hi s cas e , the pro c ess
with exp erim en ta ti o n do es no t ex hibi t ab sorbing states . The reaso n is tha t, i na n y
sta te , there wi ll a lw a ys b e a p oten tially blo c ki ng c o ali tion, s uc h tha t pl a yers k ee p
ex pe r im e n ting and the pro ce ss will ne v er settle do wn. Un de r the pu re b est{ r eply
rule ,h o w e v e r, the pro cess w i ll con verg e to an erg o dic set wi th probabi lit y one.
This c an b e e ither a n a bsorbing state w here the gra nd coa l itio n is f or m e d and the
all o cation i se ￿ ci e n t giv en tha t coa l i t i on , or a \c ycle" as in exam pl e2 . W ec a n
concl ud e tha t, in the sp ecia l cas e o f a sup erad di tiv ec ha racte ristic funct i o n, the
all o cation in a n y a bsorbing state wil l b e e￿cien t. Ho w ever, ev en for s up eradditi ve
functi o ns, con v er gence to an abs orbing s tate canno t b e g ua ran te ed b ec a use o f
the exis te nce of no n{ si ng l eton ergo dic sets. A m ore de ta i led c harac teriza t ion o f
ergo di cs e ts for g a me s with an e mp t yc or e w i ll b e su b ject to further researc h.
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